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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying 
Mrs. Coelho's motion to continue alimony in the amount of $1,000 
per month and awarding her only $1.00 per year alimony. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding 
Mr. Coelho reimbursement from Mrs. Coelho's share of the home sale 
proceeds for mortgage payments made by him pending the sale. 
The trial court's decision as to these issues is to be 
accorded considerable discretion by this court. However, although 
the court's actions are entitled to a presumption of validity, this 
court cannot affirm those actions where there has been an abuse of 
discretion. It is an error of law constituting an abuse of 
discretion for the court to fail to support its decision by 
specific and detailed findings and the findings are themselves 
subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. (See Hall v. 
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993) and Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 
1209 (Utah App. 1991).) 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REVIEW THE ALIMONY AWARD 
PURSUANT TO THE DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED IN 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, PRESIDING 
APPELLANT" S JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(i) (1994). This action 
involves the appeal of certain provisions of the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Review the 
Alimony Award Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce signed and entered 
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit County, 
State of Utah on October 4, 1994. A timely Notice of Appeal was 
filed on November 1, 1994. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
There are no specific statutes or cases which are identifiable 
as determinative authority. Instead, see cases cited in the Tables 
of Cases. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is the second appeal in this case. After the first 
trial, Mrs. Coelho appealed, among other things, the lower court's 
decision awarding her alimony in the amount of only $1,000 per 
month for a period of one year, with a review to determine whether 
alimony should continue beyond that period. This Court affirmed 
the lower Court's ruling in a Memorandum Decision entered on or 
about June 7, 1994. Mrs. Coelho filed her Motion to Review the 
Alimony Award pursuant to the Decree of Divorce on or about 
February 9, 1994, and the matter was heard before the Honorable 
David S. Young on May 10, 1994. The court denied the motion, 
refused to continue alimony at $1,000 per month and awarded alimony 
in the amount of $1.00 per year. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The plaintiff/appellant, Mrs. Mary Coelho (hereinafter Mrs. 
Coelho), and defendant/respondent, Alcides J. Coelho (hereinafter 
Mr. Coelho), were married on July 16, 1977. (R.2) Three children 
were born as issue of this marriage, Sara, now 16 years of age, 
born August 7, 1978; Tony, now 14 years of age, born August 19, 
1980; and Emily, now 8 years of age, born September 29, 1986. (R. 
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2, 13) At the first trial, the parties stipulated that the two 
youngest children would remain in Mrs. Coelho's custody, and that 
the oldest child would remain in the custody of Mr. Coelho, subject 
to liberal visitation for each of them with the child or children 
not in their physical custody. (R. 333) 
The parties' middle child, Tony, is handicapped and has been 
diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) and has started 
hearing voices and having problems at school. (R. 631) Tony 
requires substantial personal time, attention and care from Mrs. 
Coelho, who is concerned that now, because of his physical size, 
Tony could mistreat or harm his younger sister, or set the house on 
fire in her absence. (R. 632) 
After the parties married, Mrs. Coelho did not complete her 
college education but held various jobs, in addition to being a 
full-time homemaker and mother. (R. 466) She worked as a real 
estate agent during the 1980's, (R. 467) as a ski repairer, as a 
ski instructor, and as a bookkeeper for Mr. Coelho's business. (R. 
466) 
At the time of the second trial, Mrs. Coelho was a full-time 
pre-nursing student at the University of Utah (R. 634) , and also 
worked as a full-time ski instructor, which was only seasonal, and 
as a trainer in a center for handicapped adults, which was a part-
time position. (R. 626) Mrs. Coelho's earnings from the Park City 
Ski Corporation for 1993 were $4,841.61 (R. 615) and her earnings 
from Chrysalis Enterprises for 1993 were $1,717.56. (R. 617) In 
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addition, Mrs. Coelho briefly worked for Select Home Care and her 
1993 W-2 earnings from that job were $133.90. (R. 616). Her 
combined total earnings for 1993 were $6,693.07. (R. 621) 
Mrs. Coelho testified that her minimum monthly expenses, for 
herself and two children are $2,3 61.00, and that her standard of 
living has deteriorated substantially since the parties have been 
divorced. (R. 638-643) 
Mrs. Coelho testified at the second trial that, due to Tony's 
handicap and his increasing need for supervision, she could not 
work nights and weekends as she would be required to do if she 
returned to the real estate business. (R. 633) She also testified 
that she did not have an appropriate vehicle to use, and that her 
real estate license had expired in 1992. (R. 630-31, 662) 
At the time of the first trial, the lower court found that Mr. 
Coelho's earnings were $5,000 per month. At the second trial, Mr. 
Coelho was still self-employed and submitted his 1993 income tax 
return, which reflected as gross income of $48,226, and an adjusted 
gross income of $27,385. (See Exhibit 14-D) Mr. Coelho's claimed 
business expenses, as shown on his 1993 return, include deductions 
for health insurance, the use of his personal residence as an 
office, telephone charges, legal and accounting fees, and 
entertainment. 
At the second trial, Plaintiff offered evidence that Mr. 
Coelho had taken personal draws from his business in the amount of 
$48,104.93 during 11 months of 1993, or $4,373.18 per month. (Ex. 
4 
8-P) Mr. Coelho testified that much of this amount was a loan as 
he was only entitled to one-third of the draws he had taken during 
the year, and that the remaining amounts allegedly belonged to his 
two partners in the business. (R. 704) There was no evidence other 
than his testimony to support this position. 
The trial court expressed its opinion that both parties had 
made voluntary choices which reduced their present ability to earn 
amounts consistent with what they had historically earned. The 
court went on to find that Mr. Coelho's gross monthly income is 
$3,000 and that Mrs. Coelho made a voluntary choice to attend 
school rather than re-enter the work force as a real estate agent. 
(R. 747,750) The court made no specific finding as to her monthly 
income. 
After presentation of the evidence, the trial court made 
its ruling from the bench: 
1. Denying Mrs. Coelho's Motion to continue the alimony of 
$1,000 per month without prejudice, and awarding her alimony in the 
amount of $1.00 per year commencing February 1994; 
2. Terminating Mrs. Coelho's alimony award of $1,000 per 
month as of January 1, 1994; 
3. Based on its conclusion that Mrs. Coelho had insufficient 
funds to do so, the trial court entered its order requiring Mr. 
Coelho to keep the mortgage payments current on the marital 
residence in which Mrs. Coelho and two of the parties' children 
reside until the house is sold. Upon sale of the house, the court 
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ordered that Mr. Coelho be reimbursed for such payments from Mrs. 
Coelho's share of the equity. (R. 607) 
Mrs. Coelho filed her Notice of Appeal on November 1, 1994. 
(R. 797) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court abused its discretion by awarding Mrs. 
Coelho the grossly inadequate alimony amount of $1.00 per year. It 
was clear from the testimony at the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion 
that she simply had insufficient funds, even without the payment of 
the monthly mortgage, to meet her needs. Despite the overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary, the trial court did not award her any 
additional alimony to supplement her income. 
2. The trial court abused its discretion by ordering that 
Mr. Coelho be reimbursed from Mrs. Coelho's share of the equity in 
their home for mortgage payments the court ordered him to pay until 
the home was sold. The trial court's order, in light of its 
acknowledgment that Mrs. Coelho had insufficient funds to pay the 
mortgage is inherently inconsistent with its order terminating 
alimony of $1,000 per month. Further, it will result in the 
depletion of Mrs. Coelho's share of the only marital asset having 
any significant value. It is simply inequitable to require her to 
deplete this asset to meet her monthly living expenses when Mr. 
Coelho has the ability to pay alimony for this purpose. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING MRS. 
COELHO'S MOTION TO CONTINUE ALIMONY AT $1,000 PER MONTH 
AND BY AWARDING HER ALIMONY IN THE GROSSLY INADEQUATE 
AMOUNT OF ONLY $1 PER YEAR 
The factors a court must consider when making an award of 
alimony are well-settled in Utah law. In awarding alimony, a court 
is required to consider: 
1. The financial condition and needs of the 
party seeking alimony; 
2. That party's ability to produce sufficient 
income for him or herself; and 
3. The ability of the other party to provide support. 
See Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah App. 1990); Naranio v. 
Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah App. 1988); Watson v. Watson, 
837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992). 
This court has also held that the " [f]ailure to analyze the 
parties' circumstances in the light of these three factors 
constitutes an abuse of discretion." Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 
at 1147 (Utah App. 1988). 
Applying these factors to the case on appeal, the court 
clearly abused its discretion in denying Mrs. Coelho's motion to 
continue the alimony awarded to her in the Decree of Divorce and 
instead, awarding her alimony of only $1.00 per year. At the 
second trial, Mrs. Coelho testified that her monthly living 
expenses are $2,3 61.00, and this testimony was undisputed. Even 
so, the court completely failed to address the first factor and 
failed to make any findings whatsoever as to Mrs. Coelho's monthly 
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needs. This is critical to a determination of whether Mrs. Coelho 
has the ability to meet her needs without any alimony from Mr. 
Coelho. It is curious, however, that the trial court did 
acknowledge, in Finding No. 4, that Mrs. Coelho was responsible for 
the mortgage payments in the amount of $1,320 under the terms of 
the original Decree of Divorce, "but has insufficient money with 
which to do this." (R. 788) This inherent inconsistency 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. The absence of a finding in 
this regard negates the need to marshall evidence in its support. 
However, the record in this case suggests that the court concluded 
that a consideration of Mrs. Coelho7s needs was not relevant in 
light of her voluntary decision to continue her pre-nursing 
education instead of re-entering the work force. This, likewise, 
is an abuse of discretion. 
The second factor a court must consider in awarding alimony is 
the ability of a receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income 
for herself. As in the first trial, the lower court once again 
found that Mrs. Coelho had demonstrated the historical ability to 
generate sufficient income for herself as a real estate agent. 
After the second trial, the trial court simply restated its 
first findings in this regard: 
The court finds that [Mrs. Coelho] is currently 
working at employment as a [ski] instructor and 
working with disabled children, earning an income 
substantially below what she has historically 
earned when she was active as a real estate sales 
person during the 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 years, 
as reflected in plaintiff's own Exhibit 11. It is 
anticipated that [Mrs. Coelho] should be able to 
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become more gainfully employed and after a short 
period of time earn an income sufficient to meet 
her own needs based upon her demonstrated ability. 
(Finding No. 8; R.34 0 and Finding No. 1; R. 787, emphasis added) 
There is no dispute that Mrs. Coelho earned the amounts set 
forth in Exhibit 13 during the years listed. However, it is also 
undisputed that she had derived no income from selling real estate 
for more than five years before the first trial and that her 
license had expired in 1992. As Mrs. Coelho argued in the first 
appeal, the court erred in this conclusion given the period of 
time which had lapsed. At the second trial, over two years later, 
the court compounded this error by continuing to speculate that she 
could and should "maximize her earnings" by once again selling real 
estate. At this point, she has not derived income from selling 
real estate for almost seven years. 
Mrs. Coelho's current employment and income, as well as her 
full time attendance in school, are likewise undisputed. What is 
in dispute is the propriety of the court's conclusion under the 
circumstances that Mrs. Coelho has the current ability to meet her 
needs. The court seemed to recognize her dilemma when it concluded 
that Mrs. Coelho did not have the ability to pay the mortgage 
payment on the residence pending its sale and ordering Mr. Coelho 
to do so. By its very ruling in this regard, the court implicitly 
found that Mrs. Coelho has a financial need which she cannot 
satisfy and that Mr. Coelho has the ability to satisfy this need. 
This inherent inconsistency is an abuse of discretion. 
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Finally, the court must consider the ability of the defendant, 
Mr. Coelho, to pay alimony. The Court made only one finding with 
regard to Mr. Coelho's income, specifically: 
2. Based upon the evidence adduced at the 
trial on May 10, 1994, the Court finds that 
defendant has present earnings as reflected by 
his income tax return of $28,000 a year. He, 
in fact, has been drawing $4,0 00 a month but 
that draw is in part against other partner's 
money. Based upon all of the circumstances 
the Court finds that defendant's present 
earnings are $3,000 a month or $36,000 a year. 
This findings was based upon the adjusted gross income 
reflected on Mr. Coelho's 1993 tax return (Exhibit D-14) and upon 
his testimony. (R. 703-4) 
First of all, the court erred in finding that Mr. Coelho's 
present earnings were only $28,000, thereby giving him "paper 
losses," such as entertainment expense and the use of a portion of 
his residence for company purposes, to reduce his taxable income. 
The tax return also shows that his actual income from the operation 
of his business was $48,226. Further, there was no evidence, 
except Mr. Coelho's self-serving testimony to verify that he had 
two partners in his business and that he would be required to pay 
back the monies he had received. Instead, the court seemed to 
split the difference between the adjusted gross monthly income of 
approximately $2,000 and the gross monthly income of $4,000 to 
arrive at an arbitrary figure of $3,000 per month. 
The error is even more apparent in light of the expenses 
claimed by Mr. Coelho. His testimony established he had expenses 
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for rent and the mortgage payment which totalled $2,450 per month, 
plus $500-600 in credit card expenses, and his own utilities and 
other expenses. Essentially, Mr. Coelho's own figures established 
that he had paid out in personal expenses more money that he had 
claimed to earn or been able to borrow. The court ignored these 
facts. 
Based upon all of the foregoing, it is clear the lower court 
abused its discretion in denying Mrs. Coelho's motion to continue 
alimony. The parties were married for sixteen years. When a 
marriage is of long duration and the earning capacity of one spouse 
greatly exceeds that of the other, an alimony award is made to 
insure that the supported spouse may maintain a standard of living 
that would have been enjoyed had the marriage continued. (See 
Naranio, at 1147; See also Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1131, 1134 
(Utah App. 1988). Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Coelho could continue to 
enjoy the standard of living the parties had while they were 
married; however, even Mrs. Coelho's substantially compromised 
standard of living necessitated an award of alimony to sustain it. 
The parties' historical and present abilities to earn income 
are significantly and substantially disparate. The evidence of 
Mrs. Coelho's minimum needs and the reasonableness of the needs was 
undisputed. It is clear that she cannot meet these needs without 
substantial financial support from Mr. Coelho. The court 
recognized this in ordering Mr. Coelho to pay the monthly house 
payment. Finally, it was clear from the evidence that Mr. Coelho 
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has an ability to continue to pay alimony to Mrs. Coelho. In 
essence, Mrs. Coelho has been punished for her voluntary decision 
not to continue to sell real estate, while at the same time Mr. 
Coelho has been rewarded for being voluntarily underemployed. 
This court should reverse the lower court's denial of Mrs. 
Coelho's motion, and enter its own order awarding Mrs. Coelho 
alimony, retroactive to January 1, 1994, in the amount of $1,000 
per month, which should continue until she remarries, cohabits, 
dies, or until further order of the Court. In the alternative, the 
case should be remanded for appropriate findings and a 
determination of alimony. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING THAT MR. 
COELHO BE REIMBURSED FROM MRS. COELHO'S SHARE OF THE 
EQUITY IN THE MARITAL RESIDENCE FOR MORTGAGE PAYMENTS 
MADE BY HIM UNTIL IT IS SOLD 
The trial court correctly found that Mrs. Coelho had 
insufficient financial means to meet her monthly mortgage payment 
and correctly ordered Mr. Coelho to pay it. However, instead of 
properly characterizing the assistance as alimony, the court, in 
essence, characterized it as a loan. Specifically, Mr. Coelho is 
entitled to reimbursement of all amounts paid on the home from Mrs. 
Coelho's share of the equity from its sale. 
First, implicit in such a ruling is the finding that Mr. 
Coelho had the ability to pay alimony and that Mrs. Coelho is 
certainly in need of alimony. 
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Second, the ruling essentially forces Mrs. Coelho, who is 
without sufficient funds to meet her monthly expenses, to deplete 
the only major marital asset awarded to her in the Decree of 
Divorce in order to meet her monthly living expenses. This ruling 
results in a modification of the property division set forth in the 
Decree of Divorce. As a result, Mrs. Coelho has been damaged 
twice: First, her alimony was inappropriately terminated, and 
second, her share of the home equity is being depleted to meet her 
monthly expenses. Conversely, Mr. Coelho has no alimony 
obligation, and his share of this asset continues to increase in 
value. Such a result is inequitable and clearly an abuse of 
discretion. 
This court should reverse the lower court's denial of Mrs. 
Coelho's motion, enter its own order awarding her alimony 
retroactively to January 1, 1994, and continuing until she 
remarries, cohabits or dies, or until further order of the court. 
The mortgage payments made by Mr. Coelho pending entry of this 
court's order should be deemed as payments of alimony to which Mr. 
Coelho is not entitled to reimbursement. In the alternative, the 
case should be remanded with instructions to the lower court to 
make sufficient findings and enter an award of appropriate alimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court abused its discretion in denying Mrs. Coelho's 
Motion to Continue Alimony in light of the court's recognition that 
she had insufficient financial means to meet her monthly expenses. 
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Further, the lower court abused its discretion in ordering that Mr. 
Coelho be reimbursed from Mrs. Coelho's portion of the equity in 
the home for amounts paid by him on the mortgage. This results in 
a depletion of Mrs. Coelho's assets to meet her needs and a 
windfall for Mr. Coelho. This court should reverse the lower 
court's order and enter its own, awarding Mrs. Coelho $1,0 00 per 
month in alimony from January 1, 1994, until she remarries, 
cohabits, dies, or until further order of the court and 
characterizing the mortgage payments made by Mr. Coelho since 
January 1, 1994 as alimony for which he is not entitled to 
reimbursement. In the alternative, this case should be remanded 
for sufficient findings and an order awarding Mrs. Coelho an 
appropriate amount of alimony. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ' day of December, 1995. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff/Appellant. 
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